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POPULIST MOVEMENTS IN ITALY
Abstract. This paper delves into the origins of the populist movements in Italy and observes the main 
populists’ representatives in Italy, namely the North League, CasaPound and Five Star Movement.
Key words: Populist movements, North League, Right-wing, Padanian nationalism, Euroscepticism, Anti-
globalisation, Regionalism, Federalism, CasaPound, Far-right, Neo-fascism, Ultranationalism, Big tent.
The de#nitions for populism became numerous as the term itself has 
assumed, over time, various meanings that are not always negative. In 
Italy, since the end of Second World War, the term became used in the 
Italian intellectual circles, mainly by the left, to describe Peronism, thus 
acquiring a pejorative connotation as a synonym for unrealistic election 
promises used to win over the electorate1. Observing the recent 
literature on the subject, it is possible to note how often populism has 
been substituted with the term “demagoguery”. The debate appears to 
be particularly vibrant and there were no few attempts at a synthesis that 
highlights the convergence of the two terms2. The populist movements 
in Europe have begun to propagate mostly after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall. The common element in the diverse social contexts has been the 
impoverishment of the middle class. Usually, these movements share the 
premise that politics is something negative and corrupt, an expression 
of the interests of a privileged group where the people are generically 
set against this élite. This concept doesn’t necessarily coincide with the 
marxist proletariat, it rather tends to include the myriad victims of the 
inequities of power; of whom are entrepreneurs, hired workers and the 
unemployed alike.
One of the principal instruments of consensus in these movements 
is the schematic and simplistic representation of reality which leverages 
emotional reactions based on fear and the primordial desire to #nd 
a scapegoat, identi#able, for example, in immigrants or the E.U. 
whom are responsible for a broad sense of discontent. This process of 
simpli#cation necessitates a charismatic leader, a characteristic which 
1 On this argument see Hermet G., 2001.
2 On this topic see Urbinati N. (ed.), 2016.
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distinguishes the populisms form the “popular movements” arising in 
the West in recent times, such as the Indignados or Occupy Wall Street. 
Consequently, in front of this reductio, the people become the natural 
conduits of wisdom and authentic values. The interests of the common 
people do not only con&ict with the élite, but also with the intelligentsia 
responsible for a parasitic behavior and sophisticated, useless analyses 
that favor the status quo. For these reasons, many of these movements 
declare the need to transcend the divisions between “right” and “left”, 
and tend to promote a synthesis that seeks to unite elements of political 
visions which, historically, are diametrically opposed. In this essay, we 
will limit ourselves to comparing between three populist phenomena 
that have recently characterized the Italian political scene: The Northern 
League, the Five Stars Movement (M5S), and Casa Pound Italia.
The Northern League, chronologically speaking, is the #rst populist 
movement to emerge in Italy after the fall of the Berlin Wall3. Initially, 
some of the important leaders hailed from the militancy in political 
parties on the left or from the liberal tradition4, therefore, antifascism 
could be considered a founding principal. Fig. 1. At #rst, the Northern 
League presented itself as separatist movement, having as its targets the 
parasitism and corruption of Roman power, along with the ine*ciencies 
of Southern statism, to which the laboriousness and the entrepreneurial 
competence of the North were contraposed. In the attempt to create 
the iconography necessary for the homeland of the Po Valley, antique 
traditions, in part pagan and in part Christian, were rediscovered, 
coinciding with Celtic rituals, the myth of the Po river and the glorious 
history of Venice -the symbolic capital of the North- thus displaying 
from the outset the ideological &exibility that would set apart the party 
3 The name, Northern League, was adopted in 1996. Before that it was The Po Valley 
League and during the 80’s, the party was a sort of federation of diverse branches 
representing regional movements of northern Italy, for example, Venetian League, 
Lombardian League. On this topic see Scaliati G., 2006.
4 Il fondatore della Lega, Umberto Bossi, iscritto al P.C.I. tra il 1974 e il 1975 e, in 
precedenza, militante in diverse formazioni della sinistra radicale. Ugualmente, 
Roberto Maroni, ex ministro dell’interno, è stato membro di Democrazia Proletaria 
#no al 1979. Sull’argomento rimandiamo a Scaliati G., 2006.
 The founder of the League, Umberto Bossi, joined the P.C.I as a member between 
’74 and ’75, and, before that, was a militant in various factions of the radical left. 
Similarly, Roberto Maroni, ex Minister of the Interior, was a member of the Proletariat 
Democracy until 1979. On this topic see Scaliati G., 2006.
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from the twenties onwards (Fig. 2). In the political elections of 1994 the 
Northern League allied itself with the party of Silvio Berlusconi, Forza 
Italia, creating a coalition in which were also #gured the National Alliance, 
a formation heir to the disbanded neofascistic party the M.S.I. In the last 
twenty years, the Northern League had passed nine in government, 
participating in di%erent coalitions of the center-right led by Berlusconi 
as prime minister. In this period, the political physiognomy of the party 
had morphed, becoming ever more visibly rightist.
F/01 2. The founder of The North League, Umberto Bossi
F/01
4. The MEP Mario Borghezio during a meeting of the party
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Since 2014, the Secretary of the League is Matteo Salvini, elected 
with 85% of the votes of party members. In 1999, before he became 
Secretary, Salvini was the representative of an inner minority faction, 
designated the “Po Communists”. This notwithstanding, since 2014, 
the League has stressed its nationalist characteristics and its ties to 
traditional values, such as the heterosexual family, Christianity and the 
Italic Spirit, which are threatened by immigration and the presumed 
Islamic invasion, forgoing any more distinction between the North and 
South. While Article I of the League’s charter which augurs the separation 
of Padania remains in force, Salvini recently a*rmed that the League 
is no longer a separatist party, rather, if anything, it is a nationalist one 
which replaced the historic slogan “The North #rst”, with the current one, 
“Italians First”. With this move the League came closer towards the Italian 
extreme right, for example Casa Pound and the European right, like Le 
Front National of Marie Le Pen. Since 1994, the League governed, among 
others, the regions of Lombardy, Veneto and Piedmont; that is the three 
richest and most populous regions in Italy by GDP. 
F/01
5. The secretary of The North League, Matteo Salvini
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F/01 6. Beppe Grillo, the leader of the M5S
As is well-known, the Five Stars Movement (5SM) was founded in 
2008 by the Italian comic and blogger Beppe Grillo. The rapid electoral 
achievements of the 5SM became the center of political analyses within 
and beyond Italy. As of now, it is the only protest party in Europe to 
reach 25,5% of the vote at its #rst showing in the 2013 political elections, 
four years after its foundation and additional successes in the preceding 
local elections. The #gure is even more surprising if we consider that the 
party, at the time, lacked a real and proper headquarters, and that the 
organizing structure was based on a blog administered by a company 
specialized in marketing and communications. The electoral analyses 
agree in asserting that the movement has completed its transition, 
transforming itself in “a catch-all party” capable of attracting two-
thirds of the votes originating from both the center-left and the center-
right5. The M5S openly proclaims itself as anti-ideological even if at the 
European Parliament it partakes in the same group as Farage’s UKIP and 
other nationalist parties. The little-articulated ideology is compensated 
by the meticulous inner rules that tend to regulate to the last detail 
the behavior of the members of parliament and place at the center 
5 In the 2013 elections the 5SM was the party of choice among workers, (40.1%), 
entrepreneurs and small businessmen (40.2%), professionals (31.3%) and 
unemployed (42.7%): all categories that were hit hard by the economic crisis; it 
was relatively weak among housewives (20%) and retirees (11%). Overall, the 5SM’s 
constituency is younger than the national average and better educated. On this 
topic see http://bit.ly/2HS7foL.
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the #gure of Grillo. Its program is the synthesis of a series of popular 
frustrations, coming from diverse political orientations6. It’s a secular 
and pro-environment party, anti-corruption, against the privileges of 
politicians, habitually conspiratorial and apocalyptic7 which proposes 
a horizontal democracy based on web polls, favorable of a Universal 
Income for citizens and tax-reduction, moderately progressive on gay 
rights but dithering and fragmented on civil unions, anti-austerity and 
anti-Europe, anti-America but favorable of NATO. Recently it has acquired 
a xenophobic and anti-Immigration hue, moving it closer to the extreme 
right, such as Casa Pound.
Casa Pound Italy is a movement founded in 2008. O*cially, its leaders 
assert that they do not belong to neither the left nor the right, but if we 
consider their general line of thought, their symbols and slogans, we 
must, inevitably, conclude that we stand before a neofascistic party. A 
research by the English think tank Demos, de#ned Casa Pound as the 
most ambiguous emerging European populist movement in recent 
years8. Currently, this party is not present in the parliament having 
not participated in the last elections in all the Italian territory, and 
nationally it gets 0.14% of the vote. In any case, in some sensitive areas 
like the municipality of Bolzano, where Italians are a minority, they reach 
6.7% becoming strategic for certain alliances and votes. Publicly, the 
movement declares itself to be anti-violence and to possess Gandhian 
values while being a victim to the violence of the propaganda of the 
regime and the radical left movements. One of the leaders of Casa Pound 
de#ned the party as a “social association”.
From this perspective, its militants aspire to be the representatives of 
a new pop movement, active in the publishing world, in the production 
6 For example, in the 5SM the choices of the candidates are regulated through a 
complex system of voting online by members. Painstaking procedures are envisioned 
for the eventual expulsion of dissident candidates, group leaders alternate in the 
Chambers and media appearances of the candidate are subject to the scrutiny of the 
relevant commissions. For more on the argument see Tronconi F. (ed), 2015.
7 Chem-trails, under the skin microchips, Bilderberg Club and Zionist Finance are 
recurring themes with 5SM deputies. We point to the brief video di%used in 2008 
on YouTube by Casaleggio & Associates, “Gaia  — The Future of Politics”, in which, 
between 2020 and 2040 a World War is predicted between the Free West and the 
Obscurantist Orient that should reduce the global population to one billion. On this 
topic see L’Esprresso, 25/10/2016.
8 On the argument we defer to Bartlett J., Birdwell J., Froio C., 2012.
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of Rock music and the organization of cultural events, they also manage 
private TV and Radio channels as well as libraries. If we observe the 
general message and cultural production of the organization we note 
that the role attributed to violence as a political instrument changes. On 
one hand, in fact, there emerges an internal language, usually jargonish 
and symbolic, directed at the militants which justi#es and, at times, 
exults violent action. On the other, a more moderate mediatic side 
appears which belies an awareness and preoccupation on the part of 
Casa Pound not compromise the public image of the movement and its 
fragile legitimacy. At the end of the day, the use of violence is justi#ed as 
a necessary instrument to defend the movement from its hypothetical 
enemies and physical force is celebrated with its members regularly 
involved in public brawls. By admission if its own leaders, Casa Pound’s 
following is larger where social discontent exists. For these reasons 




7 Militants of Casa Pound
Overall, Casa Pound is the most syncretic of the three parties 
considered here. The references to fascism as a vital force and as an 
9 In December 2011, a CasaPound sympathizer (renamed by the newspapers ‘the 
Italian Breivik’) killed two Senegalese street vendors and wounded three others 
before killing himself in Florence. More recently, CasaPound was again at the center 
of the political debate for the aggression by one of its militants against the artistic 
director of a futuristic festival in Viterbo.
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ideal social model are constant. At the same time, Gramsci, Che Guevara 
and the anarchic songs of De André are held as cultural points of 
references. The principal cause for discord between Casa Pound and 
the other Italian extreme right movements lies in its rediscovery of 
pagan traditions alternative to Christianity, which is considered as an 
element of the corruption and weakening of the European civilization, 
similar to Nietzsche’s interpretation on the argument. However, while 
physical force is admired, gay rights are supported. In the movement, 
there are voices that are pro-environment, anti-capitalist, anti-American, 
anti-Zionist and pro-Islamic inasmuch Islam is considered an element 
of social cohesion, especially the Shi’a version which is perceived as 
more spiritual. Additionally, they are pro-Assad, and look with interest to 
#gures like Putin and Chavez.
F/01
8. A Casa Pound militant:  
“The dead body of your enemy has always a good smell”
Comparing the three factions together, it is possible to a*rm that 
all of them tend to o%er a charismatic leadership and to have common 
enemies, identi#able mainly in Immigrants, the European Union, 
International Finance, and the bureaucratic system. They also display a 
certain facility in the mixing of cultural references and diverse traditions 
and change opinion on important questions, even if these changes do not 
seem to signi#cantly disorient their respective supporters. Thereupon, 
they, especially Casa Pound the Northern League, adopt a dual language, 
aggressive and picturesque if directed at the base, and more moderate 
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before the media. In the 5SM, this discrepancy is less evident and the 
language appears more uniform even if the polemic vigor and the e%orts 
to deride the adversary are never secondary. From the ideological point 
of view, Casa Pound proposes an articulate and Elitist social model which 
seeks to regulate all aspects of social life through squatting, managing 
cultural activities, physical training for its militants and the promotion of 
events of every kind. A limit and a point of force for the Northern League 
is its rootedness in the territory, in areas that are economically signi#cant 
in the country. It is di*cult, however, given its symbolic apparatus, that it 
could descend below northern Tuscany. The 5SM appears to be the more 
&uid of the three. Contrary to Casa Pound and the Northern League, in 
fact, which don’t hesitate to take positions on various issues, the 5SM 
prefers to direct its attention on matters more topical and behind which 
there is a sure popular consensus, for example, immigrants, public order, 
corruption, etc., while remaining evasive and contradictory on more 
sensitive and divisive issues like civil unions, ius soli, legalization of light 
drugs, and religious matters in general.
All three parties are born as protest movements. Weighing the 
current approval ratings, only the 5SM can aspire to win the elections, 
even if the present electoral laws in Italy and its a priori rejection of 
eventual alliances with traditional parties provide concrete limits in the 
case of a government led by it. If this hypothesis should come to pass, 
it is presumable that the heterogeneity of its voters and of its electoral 
program, risks creating strong internal con&icts, highlighting further the 
oligarchic bent and authoritarian aspirations of the party. 
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